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Review Article
Application of the Biosafety RAM and
eProtocol Software Programs to Streamline
Institutional Biosafety Committee Processes
at the USDA-National Animal Disease Center
John P. Bannantine1 , Karen B. Register1, and David M. White2
Abstract
The National Animal Disease Center (NADC) conducts basic and applied research on endemic animal diseases of high priority
that adversely affect US livestock production or trade. Experiments conducted at this center vary in range and scope with a subset
involving synthetic or recombinant nucleic acids (DNA), microorganisms, and/or animals. Historically, the NADC used hard copy
paper and filing systems to catalog and monitor these types of experiments, but to improve communication, tracking, searching,
reporting, and documentation of Institutional Biosafety Committee (IBC) actions, this institution has transitioned to using a
commercially available software tool to digitally manage protocols in our ongoing efforts to maintain excellence in regulatory
compliance. In addition, similar to many other research institutions and universities, the scope of the IBC has expanded to include
risk assessments on all work conducted at the center. This process has been streamlined using the Biosafety RAM open source
software, developed by Sandia National Laboratories, and has stimulated productive discussions on best practices to safely
conduct animal and microbiological experiments at the center. Although some initial challenges arose, successful implementation
of these two software tools at the NADC has simplified the management of IBC compliance requirements and facilitated review
processes at a high-containment government research facility.
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Introduction
The National Animal Disease Center (NADC) is part of a mul-
ticenter United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) cam-
pus termed the National Centers for Animal Health (NCAH),
which is located in Ames, IA, USA. The NCAH is comprised of
two USDA agencies, the Agricultural Research Service (ARS),
of which NADC is part of, and the Animal and Plant Health
Inspection Service (APHIS). There are two APHIS centers as
part of the combined campus: the National Veterinary Services
Laboratories (NVSL) and the Center for Veterinary Biologics
(CVB). The mission of NADC is to conduct basic and applied
research on food safety pathogens and selected diseases of
economic importance to the US livestock and poultry indus-
tries. In operation since 1961, this 523-acre campus comprises
pastures, various biocontainment level animal housing facili-
ties, power plant generators, facilities for liquid and solid waste
decontamination, and laboratory facilities with a range of bio-
containment levels. In NADC alone, there are over 40 full-time
permanent research scientists on staff conducting research with
at least 15 different animal species. The three centers compris-
ing NCAH share a staff of safety and security professionals to
assist personnel in the safe and secure completion of their
respective missions. This assistance includes a biosafety offi-
cer, occupational health nurse, industrial hygiene specialist,
physical security manager, environmental engineers, select
agent specialists, and several safety and security technicians
to support the biocontainment research facility operations.
Finally, the facilities engineering staff operate and maintain
HVAC, waste treatment, steam generation, and electrical sup-
ply for the entire campus.
NADC is one of only a few similar research facilities in the
world and is unique in its work with a range of large animal
species, including wildlife such as bison, elk, and deer, in bio-
safety level-3 agriculture (BSL-3Ag) biocontainment.1 The
nature of diseases being studied requires that research activities
be conducted under appropriate biocontainment and biosecur-
ity conditions to prevent the spread of infectious diseases to
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nearby wildlife, livestock, poultry, and human populations.
Containment facilities include laboratory and animal biosafety
levels-2 and -3 (A/BSL-2, A/BSL-3) areas as well as a BSL-
3Ag building1 with flexible penning/gating emplacements that
can be modified to accommodate different species and sizes of
animals. The NADC is organized into four primary research
units with an average of four research projects within each
unit—viruses and prions, food safety and enteric pathogens,
infectious bacterial diseases, and ruminant diseases and immu-
nology. It is a world-class facility with a rich history and
remarkable successes in animal disease research2 and has been
a leader in developing biosafety/biocontainment methods for
livestock and poultry research.3-6
We describe two software programs recently adopted to
help streamline the workload for the NADC’s Institutional
Biosafety Committee (IBC) and Institutional Animal Care
and Use Committee (IACUC), although we focus on the
former. We further discuss the benefits and pitfalls of imple-
mentation and use for each program. As biological safety,
biosecurity, and the management and review processes that
go along with a strong safety culture become subject to
increasing external examination and perhaps regulation, the
ability to quickly and conclusively demonstrate adequate (and
even robust) review of research processes will be essential to
the operational integrity of any large research organization of
the future.
NADC’s Institutional Biosafety Committee
The NADC has an internal, standalone IBC to review experi-
ments involving synthetic or recombinant nucleic acid mole-
cules or organisms and conduct research project risk
assessments per agency policies. The NADC’s IBC was formed
approximately 10 years after the NIH guidelines were first
published in 1976.7 A total of five chairpersons have steered
the course of 31 years of IBC operations, providing remarkable
continuity. However, with the expansion of scope and com-
plexity added to the IBC role, the chairperson duties now rotate
on a more frequent basis than in the past. The committee con-
sists of all personnel required under the current NIH Guidelines
for Research Involving Recombinant or Synthetic Nucleic Acid
Molecules (NIH Guidelines) to meet the needs of an animal
research facility including a biosafety officer, veterinarians,
researchers, and institutionally unaffiliated members from the
local community. The vast majority of research conducted at
the NADC, that is within the purview of the NIH Guidelines,
falls under Section III-D, cloning into a Risk Group 2 agent.
The IBC meets monthly and over the years has reviewed a
diverse array proposed experiments. Hard-copy storage has
created numerous inefficiencies when searching for a specific
protocol, or when searching defined protocol topics, or even
when compiling reports of currently active protocols in
response to internal or external requests.
Additionally, hard copy management required all of the
burdens of paper in the digital age—physical distribution of
protocol packets, collection and documentation of
handwritten comments, and the need to bear printing costs for
documents that are only of transient use. Hard copies of pro-
tocols were not easily searchable by topic and storage became
cumbersome. Ongoing scientific and technological develop-
ments (eg, gain-of-function studies, dual use research of con-
cern, recombinant organisms with gene-drive characteristics,
etc) will likely lead to a greater and greater workload for all
IBCs, and an increased focus on management and review of
such experiments will require sufficient documentation to
easily and quickly respond to internal or external queries
related to research. In addition, use of synthetic or recombi-
nant nucleic acids or organisms in animal experiments
requires review by both the IBC and IACUC and a mechanism
for each committee to determine whether the requirements of
the other have been met. These factors led the NADC to
search for a digital solution.
IBC Protocol Management Software
In 2011, members of the NADC Senior Management Team
began searching for an online management system to replace
an older animal care and use protocol software program and
desired a program that would also track research activities
involving synthetic or recombinant nucleic acids or organisms.
Efforts led by the IACUC and the IACUC compliance officer
eventually identified a web-based commercial software appli-
cation that would integrate our needs for an animal care and use
protocol (ACUP) management software module and an IBC
protocol module. After a long and arduous process to meet
necessary USDA information technology (IT) security require-
ments, the fine-tuning of the web-based electronic protocol
management system evolved over approximately a year and a
half of weekly teleconferences with the vendor, the NCAH IT
department, and end users to ultimately meet cybersecurity and
technical institutional needs.
Specifically, the “out of the box” software had to be
modified to conform to the cybersecurity and needs of the
federal government relating to user access, levels of access,
deployment, and data integrity/disaster recovery. Likewise,
the needs of the end user or researcher included the ability
to: import laboratory and barn locations where the work
would be conducted, create and access institution-specific
help instructions, add attachments to protocols, remove
questions not applicable to this institution, develop an
institution-specific protocol numbering system and animal
ordering system, and other similar site-specific needs. Once
all of the tailoring and modifications were completed, this
version of software became known as the Research Animal
Management System (RAMS).
Within RAMS, the researcher has access to the IBC or
IACUC modules depending on whether the work proposed
includes synthetic or recombinant nucleic acids or organisms
and/or animals. The submitter is prompted to navigate through
several screens, answering questions designed to capture per-
sonnel and protocol information as well as research locations.
Within the IBC module, the project registration screen
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identifies if infectious agents, biological toxins, or synthetic or
recombinant nucleic acids or organisms are to be used in the
proposed experiments. Subsequent sections enable protocol
details to be completed. Finally, questions relating to the NIH
guidelines are asked, and then the investigator must determine
the classification of the experiment according to those
guidelines.
Once protocols are submitted, RAMS allows both the inves-
tigator and committee reviewer to interface during the review
process. A general workflow for protocols submitted in RAMS
is shown in Figure 1. Additionally, integration with IACUC is
achieved through the inclusion of ACUP protocol numbers on
IBC protocol submissions and vice versa. This provides an
important assurance gate for reviewers to be sure that experi-
ments conducted with animals that additionally include syn-
thetic or recombinant nucleic acids or organisms have been
considered by both the IBC and IACUC. This committee
cross-checking feature was written into the specifications for
the software requirements that were put out for bid by procure-
ment staff. However, there were no vendors that offered tight
integration of IACUC and IBC in a web-based format that
worked on any computer platform.
Collectively, this form of protocol management and review
has greatly streamlined the IBC, IACUC, and investigator’s
workload for IBC and IACUC submissions. On the investigator
side, the ability to duplicate previously entered protocols, using
a “clone” feature in RAMS, has greatly simplified the data
entry process. With this clone feature, the researcher has the
ability to quickly modify an existing protocol to submit as a
new experiment for review by the IBC or IACUC. This feature
is particularly helpful when personnel and protocol details in an
existing, approved protocol are similar to those of a newly
created protocol. Likewise, on the review side, each committee
member can see when a protocol has been assigned to them, the
deadline for completing a review, and the link to quickly access
the protocol. Reviewer comments and investigator responses
are permanently captured in the system and provide a rich
source of documentation for how the review was conducted.
Moving to an electronic protocol management system has
helped in the dissemination of protocols, documentation and
Figure 1. General workflow for recombinant or synthetic nucleic acid protocols submitted in Research Animal Management System (RAMS)
showing the interactions of key personnel. The workflow is divided into the investigator, Institutional Biosafety Committee (IBC) manager or
chairperson, and IBC member.
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timeliness of reviews, and ability to better archive and retrieve
historical IBC and IACUC data in response to internal or exter-
nal requests for information. This system also automatically
tracks protocol renewal dates and notifies the investigator well
in advance of expiration. A critical benefit is that the institu-
tional official and other senior managers can be given direct
electronic access to protocols, which was not previously pos-
sible. However, no system is perfect, and RAMS does have
some issues. For example, it is not possible for the investigator
to independently correct mistakes in a recently submitted pro-
tocol prior to its review by the IBC since protocols are locked
once they have been routed to the committee. Instead, the IBC
chairperson must be contacted for help in getting the protocol
returned to the investigator for correction and resubmission. In
our experience, this has happened frequently, and the process is
cumbersome and frustrating to the investigator. However,
despite this operational issue for the submitter, the protocol
must be “frozen” after submission to preserve the integrity of
the review process, so this feature must be maintained or
addressed in some way. Nonetheless, it would be beneficial if
the investigator retained rights to edit the protocol until the
time a committee member accessed it for review (instead of
upon submission and routing). Finally, there is a considerable
upfront investment of time to program the software for gener-
ating automated renewal, expiration, and approval notices to
investigators as well as automated committee and review
assignment notices to IBC members.
Risk Assessment Software—Biosafety RAM
Performing risk assessments is a constant need in daily life
activities and especially so in biological research. The NADC
wanted to measure risk based on what is being done in an
experiment and what potential hazards are present and catalog
what methods and resources are in place to mitigate resulting
risks. The goal was to perform risk assessments in a standar-
dized and repeatable manner that could be compared across
laboratories conducting research at the same institution. This
process is not trivial, and a method to more easily, consistently,
and comprehensively measure risk was sought.
The Biosafety RAM is an open source software package
developed at Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) that enables
a consistent platform for biological risk assessment regardless
of the institutional environment.8 The SNL collaborated with
biosafety, infectious disease, and risk experts around the world
to develop the software. The tool was designed to evaluate both
the likelihood of accidental pathogen release or unintended
infection as well as the consequences of such events after all
institutional controls and policies have been considered. The
tool only measures relative risk, not absolute risk. This soft-
ware is particularly useful in several aspects of a formal risk
assessment as defined by the BMBL.1 These aspects include:
1. The range and scope of the questions stimulate the
respondent to fully assess all aspects of the risk in their
work (agent and laboratory procedure hazards).
2. In limiting the scope of each assessment to a research-
focused area for the NADC, respondents consider who
is doing the work and the specific facility features
where the work is performed.
3. By submission of the Biosafety RAM output to the IBC,
review by an expert committee (inclusive of a biosafety
professional) is assured.
4. The Biosafety RAM graphical output is particularly
useful for summary reviews or reviews with members
of the public (should outreach initiatives be necessary).
Currently, version 2.5 of the Biosafety RAM program is
used at the NADC. The assessment consists of a set of 105
questions with the investigator-provided responses collectively
describing the locations, materials, procedures, and practices
proposed for use. The program assigns a value to each answer
provided, ranging from 0 to 4, which is used as the input for an
assessment algorithm that outputs both a graphical display of
the relative risks (with the likelihood of occurrence plotted
against the consequence of occurrence) and a detailed,
question-by-question, numerical report. All 105 responses are
binned into a total of 19 categories of risk (Table 1), some
pertinent to humans in the laboratory or in the surrounding
community (Figure 2) and others pertinent to animals in the
community. If both likelihood and consequence are scored at
1.25 or lower on the resulting scatter plot outputs (Figure 2), the
biosafety risk is considered very low. Conversely, if both like-
lihood and consequence are plotted above 3.25, the biosafety
risk is considered very high. In that case, the proposed loca-
tions, materials, practices, and procedures should be analyzed
to determine which can be modified to reduce the degree of risk
to an acceptable level. This analysis is facilitated by the numer-
ical report, which provides a detailed, quantitative breakdown
as to which questions feed into each risk category, the weight
assigned to each question, and the resulting score based on the
answer provided by the investigator.
The Biosafety RAM tool attempts to create a framework for
comprehensive risk assessment and facilitated review. The
response to any question can be changed and the output ree-
valuated to determine if the alternative measures do indeed
lower the risk of one or more categories. In this way, by break-
ing out the risk drivers in the algorithmic assessment and com-
paring different responses to related questions, the tool can be
used to help researchers determine best methods to reduce
biological threats in the laboratory. This allows respondents
to examine what materials, practices, or facility features have
the biggest influence on overall risk and target their safety and
security efforts to the most efficient and effective mitigation
strategies. It should be noted that the tool can also be used to
determine if cumbersome control measures are excessive and
unnecessary such that their elimination has little effect on risk.
Caution should be used here since the determination of risk as
acceptable, controllable, or unacceptable is dependent on the
workers and institutional management.
The Biosafety RAM is a useful tool to greatly simplify risk
assessment, but it is still a work in progress that would benefit
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from further refinement. For example, there appears to be a bug
in the program that occasionally results in the appearance of
“NaN” in one or more of the scored risk categories, which is a
common abbreviation for “not a number.” This finding sug-
gested that there was something wrong with the program’s
handling of a combination of responses to questions that fed
into a particular risk category. As a result, the risk could not be
accurately measured for any category that showed NaN in the
output. An analysis of this problem was conducted by compil-
ing the scores for each of the 19 risk categories (Table 1) on
past risk assessments submitted to the IBC. From this exercise,
the problem categories that frequently gave a NaN and those
categories that always provided a numerical risk score were
determined. All of the responses to questions that fed into one
of the selected problem categories (ingestion in animals) were
then compiled. From this analysis, it appeared that certain
combinations of responses led to the NaN designation for
ingestion in animals category on the Biosafety RAM assess-
ment. Although the appearance of NaN in the scoring of other
categories was not comprehensively studied by us, this is a
Figure 2. Graphical output from the Biosafety Research Animal Management System (RAMS) showing the degree of risk to humans in the
laboratory and community for (A) a Risk Group 2 Salmonella species in a well-maintained BSL-2 laboratory and (B) a Risk Group 3 highly
pathogenic avian influenza virus in a poorly maintained BSL-2 laboratory. Each scatter plot shows the likelihood versus consequence of 9 risk
categories. The risk category key is shown between the 2 graphs, and areas of low, medium, and high risks are marked within the plot. Note the
risk is much higher if handling a Risk Group 3 agent in conditions not appropriate for safely handling such an agent.
Note. Coloured version of this figure is available online at http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/1535676018767904
Table 1. Comparison of Analyzed Risk Categories with Graphically Displayed Risks.a
Risk Category Graphically Displayed Risk
Likelihood ingestion individual Ingestion risk to individual
Likelihood inhalation individual Inhalation risk to individual
Likelihood percutaneous individual Percutaneous risk to individual
Likelihood contact individual Contact risk to individual
Consequence of disease to humans
Secondary consequence of disease to humans
Likelihood ingestion community Ingestion risk to community
Likelihood inhalation community Inhalation risk to community
Likelihood percutaneous community Percutaneous risk to community
Likelihood contact community Contact risk to community
Consequence of disease to the community
Likelihood ingestion animal Ingestion risk to animal community
Likelihood inhalation animal Inhalation risk to animal community
Likelihood contact animal Contact risk to animal community
Consequence of disease to animals
Secondary consequence of disease to animals
Likelihood of secondary transmission human Secondary transmission risk (human)
Likelihood of secondary transmission animal Secondary transmission risk (animal)
aNot all risk categories are graphically displayed as some categories are combined to produce a data point for the graph.
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problem that will (hopefully) be addressed as newer versions
are released.
Another limitation of the tool is that it does not consider the
scope of the work to be performed or factor in an overall
assessment of the training and competency of the personnel
performing the work and/or the suitability of the facilities
where the work is performed. Therefore, a full review and
assessment of the Biosafety RAM output should be performed
only by local officials with a high degree of detailed knowledge
of the laboratory’s operations. The NADC IBC has circum-
vented one of these issues by requiring that investigators add
a brief paragraph describing the scope of work to be performed
on their risk assessment cover page. One of the value-additions
of the time invested in completing such a risk assessment is to
document and display a highly robust and defensible process to
external reviewers; without such information, external
reviewers will likely not be able to fully appreciate the safety
and security provisions engaged to protect laboratory personnel
and the surrounding community.
A beneficial feature of the Biosafety RAM is that the text of
each question can be edited to add clarity for the respondent.
For example, a question involving direct contact exposure was
modified by adding the parameters of infection through intact
skin or via the ocular or urogenital mucous membranes. How-
ever, this capability must be used with caution, ensuring that
modifications do not affect the scoring algorithms or alter the
intent of the questions. Should this occur, the assessment may
be invalid. Therefore, modifications of the original text should
be made only when there is a need to clarify some aspect of the
question being asked. When a specific research situation does
not fit neatly into the underlying assumptions of a question, the
addition of a short, explanatory statement can also be helpful.
Conclusion
Inevitably, no matter how much work with the vendor is done
prior to purchasing biosafety and compliance software, there
will be a need to further modify either the forms or other
aspects of any software package employed to manage protocol
or risk assessment submission and review. Therefore, the abil-
ity to modify the software over time has been critical to the
NADC’s implementation and use of these software tools.
A key benefit of the Biosafety RAM software as applied at
the NADC is the inclusion of all scientists and project person-
nel in the risk assessment process. When each risk assessment
is conducted, the engineering biosafety controls designed into a
specific lab or animal biocontainment facility are considered
and discussed, which serves to educate all parties involved
about the overall facility features including air handling, waste
stream handling controls, and personal protective equipment
and other procedural methods in place to mitigate risks of the
work down to an acceptable level.
Furthermore, implementation of these tools has enabled the
NADC to better catalog, search, and create reports that detail
risk assessments of research involving infectious agents, bio-
logical toxins, and synthetic or recombinant nucleic acids and
organisms. This has enabled the center to more completely
capture the scope of research actively being conducted at the
NADC. The communication has also been enhanced between
the IACUC and IBC committees with relevant protocol num-
bers from IACUC included on the IBC submission forms and
vice versa. However, it is important to have a member on both
committees to further facilitate communication. For NADC,
this is accomplished by the biosafety manager.
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